Submission 96

Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2023
To: ConstitutionalReform
Subject: Recommendations For Reform of Parliament and the Electoral System

Dear Commissioners,

I have the honour to submit the attached recommendations to the Constitutional Reform Commission on the need for parliamentary and electoral reform to ensure that elections produce representative parliaments; parliament is more effective in its oversight function; our democracy is strengthened by providing the opportunity for persons/non-partisan interest to have a greater involvement in the governance of public affairs; and the elimination of the possibility of corrupt practices to finance elections.

REFORM OF PARLIAMENT AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

1.Section 48(1) of the Constitution of Barbados states “subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Barbados”.

2. Section 64(2) states “The Cabinet shall be the principal instrument of policy and shall be charged with the general direction and control of the government of Barbados and shall be collectively responsible therefor to Parliament”.

3.Section 72(1) states “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President (Governor-General), acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may by directions in writing, assign to the Prime Minister or any other minister, responsibility for any business of the Government including the administration of any department of the Government”.

4. Sections 48(1) and 64(2) set out two very important functions of Parliament and, when section 72(1) is considered, Ministers are responsible to Parliament both collectively for the overall performance of the Government and individually for the performance of any department of the Government that they are assigned. However, section 4(2) of the Public Service Act, CAP 29 places the responsibility on the Permanent Secretary for the management of the Ministry/Department to which the Permanent Secretary is assigned.

5. Generally, we may be satisfied with Parliament’s discharge of its law-making function. However, we cannot be satisfied with the discharge of its oversight of the Executive/Cabinet function, as required by Section 64(2). Emphasis must be placed on the important oversight function of Parliament, lest its role becomes increasingly diminished, or becomes inferior to that of the Executive/Cabinet. One of the main reasons for this concern is that the Executive/Cabinet in Barbados appears to dominate Parliament. The 2018 and 2022 Parliaments are very good examples of such dominance since most of the members of the House of Assembly are members of the Executive, either as ministers or parliamentary secretaries. Furthermore, Parliament has not established an effective committee system. Even of greater concern, the Public Accounts Committee has not been very effective. Members of the Executive/Cabinet are also members of this Committee. Therefore, we should take this opportunity to strengthen Parliament so that it can be more effective in its oversight of the Executive/Cabinet role/function, thereby ensuring greater accountability in the conduct of national affairs.

RECOMENDATIONS:

6.The parliamentary reforms suggested in this submission are intended to work in tandem with a reform of our present electoral system of First Past the Post (FPTP). We inherited FPTP from the British and in one sense it has served us well in that it has been a major factor in the emergence of a two-party system with the two parties alternating in office at regular intervals. This has contributed to Barbados’ legendary political stability, though it is by no means the most important reason for that stability, which is based on our high level of social trust and an educated citizenry. On the other hand, FPTP has resulted in too many elections in which a party’s share of the vote is not reflected in that party’s share of seats in parliament. For example, the BLP in 2018 and 2022 won all 30 seats while receiving 73.25% and 69.03%, respectively, of the votes cast. In contrast, the DLP won in 2018 and 2022 21.80% and 26.55%, respectively, of the votes cast but gained no representation in Parliament. In the case of New Zealand, they abandoned FPTP because of the 1981 election in which the party that won the largest share of the votes cast did not win a majority of the seats and therefore could not form the government. A commission investigated all the alternatives to FPTP including Proportional Representation (PR) and unanimously recommended the Mixed Member Proportional Voting (MMPV). Under this system each voter casts two ballots, one for the constituency representative and one for the preferred party. MMPV was confirmed by referendum in 1993.

UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENT

6.1. The recommendation of a unicameral parliament as put forward in paragraphs 20 to 22 of Peter Laurie’s submission, dated 6 February 2023, to the

Constitutional Reform Commission, is supported:

“The Legislature. One of the most effective ways of limiting the powers of the executive is to strengthen the powers of the Legislature. I suggest we change to a unicameral legislature. The Senate is a neo-colonial anachronism that serves no purpose other than to groom political hopefuls for elected office or to provide a sinecure for those who failed to win a seat in the House or those who need to be otherwise placated. The traditional argument for two legislative chambers is that an upper chamber acts as a brake on legislation proposed by the popularly elected representatives. The assumption is that the latter (aptly named the “Commons” in the UK) will take rash decisions that need to be tempered by the unelected (aptly named the “Lords” in the UK). I think we have passed beyond such ridiculous class snobbery.

Of the 192 parliaments in the world 113 are unicameral and 79 are bi-cameral”.

REFORM OF FIRST PAST THE POST

6.2. In the proposed unicameral parliament, two-thirds of the members should be elected on a constituency basis and one-third based on one of the options set out below. Applying this formula to the present configuration of the elected chamber of our parliament would yield a unicameral parliament of 45 members: 30 seats elected on the constituency basis and 15 seats on one of the options set out below.

6.2.1. The Mixed Member Proportional Voting system used in New Zealand could be used. In that system, an elector has two votes, one for the representative of his constituency and the other for a preferred political party. The percentage of the total votes cast in the preferred political party ballot for a party would determine the number of additional seats the party would gain. A party would have to publish before the elections its list of nominated persons from which it would select the persons to hold the additional seats it gained. New Zealand’s unicameral parliament has 120 members of which 48 (40 percent) are determined based on the preferred political party vote.

6.2.2. A party’s percentage of the aggregate of valid votes cast by the electorate would determine the number of the additional seats it would be allocated. A party would have to obtain at least 6.67 percent of the total valid votes cast to have one of the additional 15 seats allocated to it in the unicameral parliament. A party would have to publish before the elections its list of nominated personsfrom which it would select the persons to hold the additional seats it gains.

6.2.3. The island could be designated as one constituency, “the national constituency” and the elector would vote for his local constituency representative and vote for a representative for the “national constituency”. The 15 persons contesting for the “national constituency” with the most votes would be elected. A party would have to publish ahead of the elections its list of nominated persons for the “national constituency”.

6.2.4 Options 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 are party focused whereas option 6.2.3 introduces a personal or individual element. This makes option 6.2.3 more favorable to independent candidates contesting for a seat in the elected chamber. It might be more advantageous for an independent candidate with broad national appeal/recognition to contest for the “national constituency” instead of a local constituency.

6.2.5. It should be noted that the recommended reform of the electoral system would, unless one party received 100 percent of the popular vote, always result in an opposition party or parties being elected to parliament and, therefore, in there being always a Leader of the Opposition. This is not the case as we have seen with the First Past the Post System. Under the option set out in paragraph 6.2.2, the DLP would have gained 3 and 4 seats, respectively in 2018 and 2022, in the proposed unicameral Parliament. In addition, the recommended reform of the electoral system is still pertinent and relevant even if a bi-cameral parliament is retained.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE SYSTEM

6.3. Parliament needs to establish an effective parliamentary committee system to provide oversight over the Executive/Cabinet but also to enhance our democracy by providing the opportunity for persons to participate directly in the governance of the country instead of their participation being limited to voting in elections. Individual members of the public and representatives of civil society will be able to appear before Committees to provide comments/suggestions on any matter being considered by Parliament before it makes a final decision on it. The Parliamentary Committees would have the authority to investigate issues affecting the nation in the same way that such committees in the Congress of the United States of America and the Parliament of the United Kingdom and other countries do. No Minister or Parliamentary Secretary should be a member of a parliamentary committee. The committees should have the authority to summon Ministers, parliamentary secretaries, officials, and individuals.

6.3.1. The following Committees could be established: (1). Public Finance, Monetary and Financial System, and Commercial State-owned Enterprises: this

Committee would carry out the present remit of the Public Accounts Committee; (2). Economy/Productive Sectors; (3). Health, Social Services and Community; (4). Education, Human Resources, and Labour/Workforce Relations; (5). Governance and Administration; (6). Foreign Affairs, Diaspora, International Trade, and CARICOM; (7). Transport and Infrastructure; (8). Commerce and Related Regulatory Matters; and (9). Home Affairs and Security.

6.3.2. It might be helpful to the committee system if Parliament could dedicate at least one day a week exclusively to the work of the committees.

FIXED ELECTORAL CYCLE

6.4. General elections should be held every five years on the Friday closest to the 15th of September or 15th of October and the new administration would be effective from the 1st of October or the 1st of November. There would be a short transition/handover period. Effectively, the term of office would be for 5 years from 1st October/1st November to 30th September/31st October. The Annual Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure are prepared on a rolling 3-year basis and a new administration would have sufficient time to finalize the preparation of the Estimates before they are laid, debated/examined, and approved by Parliament by 31st March.

THE SIZE OF THE CABINET

6.5. The Cabinet should not be larger than one third of the members of parliament. With a unicameral parliament of 45 members, the Cabinet would comprise the Prime Minister and 14 other ministers. This would ensure that there are sufficient members of parliament to provide effective oversight. It would also prevent the country from having an unduly large Cabinet and lead to a more rational formation of ministries and eliminate the expenditure associated with the constant reformulation of ministries, between and after elections. Core ministries for the management of the nation’s business should be identified so that there would not be changes in the names, stationery, letterheads etc. each time there is a minor or major change, within or between administrations.

ELECTORAL/DEMOCRACY FUND

6.6. The new constitution should mandate the creation of an electoral/democracy fund to support political parties and persons contesting

elections for public office. The Fund would be financed by monies voted by parliament and financial contributions from persons: individual and corporate. Consequently, private contributions to political parties and individuals contesting elections would not be allowed. This would ensure that political parties and politicians would not be held hostage by persons with deep pockets and eliminate the possibility of corrupt practices to gain funds to contest elections. The Electoral and Boundaries Commission would manage the fund.

ELECTORAL AND BOUNDARIES COMMISSION

6.7. The Electoral and Boundaries Commission, under sections 41A (2) and (3) of the Constitution, is currently limited to five members, and appointed in the following manner. The chairman and two other members are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The deputy chairman and other member are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Leader of the Opposition after consultation with the Prime Minister. Given the recommendation for the creation of an Electoral/Democracy Fund to be managed by this Commission it is necessary to reduce its partisan composition.

6.7.1. Therefore, it is proposed that the membership of the Commission be increased to seven and appointed as follows: The Chairman and deputy chairman be appointed by the President using his/her discretion; three members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition; and two members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Leader of the Opposition after consultation with the Prime Minister.

RETENTION OF A REFORMED BI-CAMERAL PARLIAMENT.

7.The members of this group support the foregoing recommendations. However, there was also a view that the group’s input should be provided in the event of any decision made to retain a reformed bi-cameral Parliament. Therefore, the following recommendations are set out below.

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

7.1. It is recommended that New Zealand’s Mixed Member Proportional Voting model be used to elect members of the elected chamber, the House of Assembly. It is further proposed that 75 percent of the members of the House of Assembly be elected on a constituency basis and the remaining 25 percent based on one of the options set out in paragraphs 6.2.1, 6.2.2 or 6.2.3. Applying this ratio to our current membership of the House of Assembly would yield a 40-member elected chamber: 30 members elected on the constituency basis and 10 based on the options set out above. Under option 6.2.2, The DLP, in 2018 and 2022, would have gained 2 and 3 seats, respectively, in the House of Assembly.

THE SENATE

7.2. The present constitution makes provision for a Senate in section 35 which states ‘There shall be a Parliament of Barbados which shall consist of the President, a Senate and a House of Assembly”. Section 36(1) limits the membership to twenty-one (21) members and Sections 36(2), (3) and (4) set out how they are to be appointed. The purpose of the senate is not delineated but it traditionally follows the Westminster model where like the House of Lords, it has played an important role in the legislative process.

7.2.1. The 1998 Constitution Reform Committee was of the view that the “major part of the work of the Senate in our parliamentary system is to review and if appropriate revise legislation and resolutions passed by the House of Assembly. The purpose of the Senate is clearly not to obstruct or to frustrate the business of Government. It is important that Government should always have a comfortable majority in the Senate and that those who do not support the Government have adequate representation to enable them effectively to present their views. It is also important that an opportunity be provided for the representation on nonpartisan interest whose representatives should be dispassionate and forthright in debating issues of national concern. The concerns can be adequately met with the present size of the Senate, now fixed at twenty-one members”.

7.2.2. Therefore, it is recommended that:

(a). The Senate should continue to complement the process of government rather than duplicate the role of the House of Assembly.

(b). The Senate should be comprised of 25 members appointed by the President. Thirteen (13) appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister; five (5) on the recommendation of the Leader of the Opposition; and 7 by the President with persons of expert knowledge on several related subjects and representing identified interests in the society and as non-partisan as possible.

(c). The Senate should continue to review and revise legislation and resolutions passed by the elected representatives in the House of Assembly including money resolutions.

(d). The Senate must have the authority to delay or return resolutions to the elected chamber for further considerations.

(e). Members of the Senate should be members of the Parliamentary Committees recommended in paragraphs 6.3 and 6.3.1.

THE SIZE OF THE CABINET

7.3. The size of the Cabinet, under the reformed bi-camera I parliamentary system, should be limited to one quarter of the membership of the bi-camera I Parliament. This would produce a Cabinet of the Prime Minister and 15 other Ministers.

CONCLUSION

8. The proposed reforms seek to ensure that elections produce a more representative parliament; parliament is more effective in its oversight function; our democracy is strengthened by providing the opportunity for persons/non­partisan interest to have a greater involvement in the governance of public affairs; and the elimination of the possibility of corrupt practices to finance elections.

REFORM OF PARLIAMENT AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM-SUPPLEMENTAL

(14 APRIL 2023)

1.INTRODUCTION

1.1. The chairman of the Constitutional Reform Commission requested the group, after reviewing its submission of 21 March 2023 on the Reform of Parliament and the Electoral System, to examine further reform of the First Past The Post system; public financing of political parties and campaigns; and the Senate, especially the appointment of Senators by the Head of State. The results of that further investigation are set out below.

2.REFORM OF FIRST PAST THE POST

THE ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM (AMS)

2.1. The Additional Member System is a mix of Westminster’s First Past the Post system and Party Lists. Voters in the UK use the Additional Member System (AMS) to elect the parliaments of Scotland and Wales, and the London Assembly. When used in Germany and New Zealand it is called Mixed Member Proportional (MMP).

2.2. Voters have two ballot papers. On the first is a list of candidates who want to be the local Member of Parliament (MP). In Scotland, they are called Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) and in Wales, Members of the Senedd (MS). The voter marks their preferred candidate with a cross. On the second ballot paper is a list of parties which want seats in parliament. Each party will publish a list of candidates in advance. A vote for a party is a vote to make more of their list of candidates into MPs.

2.3. In Scotland, voters elect 73 MSPs from the Westminster-style first ballot paper and 56 from the second ballot paper.

2.4. The Westminster-style ballot papers are counted first. The candidate with the most votes in the constituency wins. The second ballot papers are then counted. The people counting look at how many seats a party won on the first ballot paper. They then add ‘additional members’ from the party lists to make parliament match how the country voted on the second ballot paper.

2.5. So, if a party has 5 MPs from the constituencies and its fair share is 8 MPs then 3 candidates from its list become MPs. This is either done in regions, as in Scotland or Wales, or countrywide, as in New Zealand. The goal is to provide a proportional parliament but also keep a single local MP.

2.6. The Additional Member System has become popular as some see it as a compromise solution. But, as a compromise, it keeps Westminster’s ‘safe seats’ that rarely change hands. It also adds lists of candidates chosen by the political parties. While this system is a massive improvement over Westminster’s system, parties still have a lot of control over who gets elected.

2.7. Some also argue that the Additional Member System creates two classes of MPs, and that this can create tension. For instance, constituency MPs receive local casework, whilst the party-list MPs do not. But the list MPs can provide a second layer of representation should the voter feel their MP does not represent them. They also ensure that every party can potentially win seats in every area. This ensures the government cannot ignore parts of the country.

3. ELECTORAL/DEMOCRACY FUND

3.1. The proposed Electoral/Democracy Fund, along with appropriate regulations to ensure transparency and public accountability, would address the concerns raised in the excerpt below from the article on Campaign Financing written by Andre Munro in Encyclopedia Britannica (para 3.2 below); the issues specific to Barbados highlighted by Wickham and Marshall (para 3.3 below); and those issues identified in the main finding of an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study “ Financing Democracy: Financing of Political Parties and Election Campaigns and the Risk of Policy Capture (February 2016)” (para 3.4 below.

3.2. “Campaign finance, raising and spending of money intended to influence a political vote, such as the election of a candidate. Political parties and candidates require money to publicize their electoral platforms and to pursue effective campaigns. Attempts to regulate campaign finance reflect the commonly held belief that uncontrolled political fund-raising and spending can undermine the integrity of the democratic process and erode the confidence of the electorate in political institutions. Campaign finance raises fundamental ethical questions for democratic regimes. Most often, debates about campaign finance revolve around the protection of freedom of expression and the prevention of corruption, two democratic principles that can enter into conflict with one another. On the one hand jurists have often considered financial participation in a campaign (either through donations or spending) to be a form of political expression that must be constitutionally protected from censorship. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that regulations and limits can justifiably be placed on campaign finances in order to prevent corruption. By regulating campaign fund-raising and spending, governments seek to avoid a situation whereby politicians use the power associated with their office to reward large contributors, ……. such persons/individuals gain a privileged channel to express their interest and opinions. In addition to preventing outright corruption, campaign finance regulations thus seek to limit the undue influence of money in politics”.(Andre Munro).

3.3. Wickham, Peter W. and Marshall, Dave, in an article entitled “Political Party and Campaign Financing in Barbados” written sometime after the 2003 election, highlighted that lack of a regulatory framework, secrecy surrounding contributions to political parties, and the precarious nature of party finances generally but exacerbated when in opposition or having no presence in Parliament. The article concluded:

“As has been stated earlier, there is no major regulatory mechanism in place which govern political party financing in Barbados. Consequently therefore, there is no requirement or indeed any intention on the part of political parties to publicly disclose such details. Indeed, as has been stated by the BLP official, the disclosure of financing is unheard of even within the upper echelons of the party itself, far less the wider public. Parties are therefore unlikely to maintain records of any party spending and financing in order to maintain the anonymity of party financiers and well-wishers. This leads one to conclude that the unregulated nature of political party financing in Barbados is a process generally shrouded in secrecy, a lack of transparency and accountability in the public at large”.

3.4. The main findings of the OECD study referenced above were as follows: “Financing is a necessary component of the democratic process. It enables the expression of political support and competition in elections. However, money may be a means for powerful narrow interest to exercise undue influence, resulting in inadequate policies that go against the public interest. Current funding rules need attention to ensure a level playing field for all democratic actors. While many countries have adopted online technologies to support proactive disclosure, there remains a need for more efficient and independent oversight and enforcement. Political finance regulations are ineffective in isolation. They need to be part of an overall integrity framework that includes the management of conflict of interest and lobbying”.

4. PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNS BARBADOS

4.1. Public funding of political parties in Barbados is very limited. The Parliament (Administration) Act 1989 (CAP 10) provides for the funding of the emoluments of the staff of the Leader of the Opposition and those of the constituency assistants of members of the House of Assembly. There is no public funding of political campaigns.

4.2. However, reference has been made to a $ 300K subvention under the Commission of Parliament which is distributed to political parties based on their representation in the House of Assembly. The Clerk of Parliament was requested to provide information about this subvention, but no information was provided at the time of finalizing this supplement.

AUSTRALIA:

4.3. The Labour government in 1984 introduced public funding for political parties with the intention that it would reduce the parties’ reliance on corporate donations. To be eligible for public funding, a political party needs to be registered with the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. A candidate or a Senate group is eligible for election funding if they obtain 4% of the first preference (primary) vote in the division (House of Representatives) or State/Territory (Senate) they contested.

4.4. The amount payable is calculated by multiplying the number of first preference votes received by the rate of payment applicable at the time. The rate of payment is indexed every six months in line with increases in the Consumer Price Index.

4.5. New rules for the 2019 election included that parties need to provide evidence of electoral spending to the AEC and their potential public funding was capped in relation to their electoral spending, they cannot receive more public funding than they spent.

4.6. In Australia, most private political donations come in the form of donations from corporation, which go towards the financing of the parties’ election advertising campaigns. Donations and affiliation fees from trade unions also play a big role and to a lesser extent donations from individuals. The AEC monitors donations to political parties and publishes a yearly list of political donors.

NEW ZEALAND:

4.7. All registered parties are eligible for public funds during general electionperiods to broadcast election programmes and advertising. The funds are distributed to parties by the Electoral Commission according to several quantitative and qualitative statutory criteria, including previous election results, by-election results, party members in parliament before dissolution, cross-party relationships, indicators of support (i.e., opinion polls) and the need to provide a fair opportunity to all parties.

UNITED KINGDOM

4.8. Political parties in the United Kingdom may be funded through membership fees, party donations or through state funding, the latter of which is reserved for administrative costs. The Conservative party relies on donations mostly from individuals and corporations; as well as these sources the Labour party receives a significant portion of its donations from trade unions.

4.9. Opposition parties receive state funding to pay administration costs through “Short Money” in the House of Commons starting from 1975, and “Cranborne Money” in the House of Lords starting in 1996. However, there is no state funding available to parties for campaign purposes. In addition, there is a general policy development grant available to parties with two sitting members of the House of Commons.

GERMANY

4.10. Political parties in Germany have three main sources of income: state funding; contributions members or from the salaries of elected official such as MPs; and private or corporate donations. State funding is based upon the party’s “rootedness in society”. This is calculated according to how many votes a party has won in the last European, federal, and state elections, and how much it has received in membership contributions and donations.

4.11. The idea is that the more relevant a political party is for society at large, the greater its need for neutral financing. Smaller, or newer parties, thus have an inherent disadvantage in the German system. A party can never receive more state funding than it generates through its own revenue in any given year. In other words, up to 50 percent of a party’s income can come from the state. The total ceiling on state funding for political parties is set each year by the president of the Bundestag.

FRANCE

4.12. Political parties may not receive more than 7500 euros a year from individuals and any contribution greater than 152 euros must be made by cheque. The principal source of contributions, however, is from the regular payments made by party members, which in 2008 was equal to 35% on average across all political parties. During an election, political candidates are allowed to receive a further 4600 euros per year per individual. Businesses have been forbidden from making party donations since 1995.

4.13. Every year political parties receive state grants based on two factors, called “fractions”. The first depends on the proportion of the vote won by a party in the last round of parliamentary elections. The second is calculated by the actual number of seats the party wins in parliament. This funding represents 40% of party fuds across the board. In a presidential election, the state reimburses 20% of campaign costs to all parties. Should the parties gain more than 5% of the total vote, they are rebated 50% of their costs.

CANADA

4.14. The financial activities of political parties in Canada were largely unregulated until the Election Expenses Act was passed in 1974. There is now an extensive regime regulating federal political party financing: both during and outside of election periods. Such regulations encourage greater transparency of political party activities. It also ensures a fair electoral arena that limits the advantages of those with more money. Political parties and candidates are funded both privately and publicly. Election finance laws govern how parties and candidates are funded; as well as the ways in which they can spend money.

4.15. There are two forms of state funding to political parties and to candidates. First, political parties and candidates are reimbursed for some of their election expenses. Political parties that received either two per cent of the national vote or five per cent of the vote in the district in which they ran a candidate get back 50 per cent of the money they spent. Candidates who received at least 10 per cent of the vote receive 15 per cent of the election expenses limit in their district. If the candidate spent at least 30 per cent of the limit during the election, the reimbursement increases to 60 per cent of what the candidate spent.

4.16. Second, there are tax credits for donations to political parties and candidates. The first $ 400 of donations receives a 75 per cent tax credit. An amount between $ 400 and $ 750 receives a 50 per cent tax credit. Amounts over $ 750 receive a 33 per cent tax credit. An individual’s total tax credit in one year cannot exceed $ 650.

4.17. Federal election finance laws put limits on contributions to political parties and candidates. Only individuals- not corporations and trade unions- may donate. Contributions are limited to up to $ 1500 a year to each political party and up to $1500 to all registered electoral district associations; as well as contestants seeking the party’s nomination and candidates for each party. In addition, donors may give up to $ 1500 to leadership contestants and up to $ 1500 to independent candidates. These limits were imposed in 2015 and increase by $ 25 each year. Donations of more than $ 200 must be disclosed.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

4.18. The financing of electoral campaigns in the USA happens at the federal, state, and local level by contributions from individuals, corporations, political action committees (PACS), and sometimes the government/public funds. In 2020, nearly $ 14 billion was spent on federal election campaigns, making it the most expensive in USA history.

4.19. Critics complain that following several Supreme Court decisions—Citizens United vs FEC (2010) in particular—the very wealthy are now allowed to spend unlimited amounts on campaigns through “Super PACs and to prevent voters from knowing who is trying to influence them (contributing “dark money” that masks the donor’s identity). Critics, such as the Brennan Centre for Justice allege “big money dominates USA political campaigns to a degree not seen in decades” and is “drowning out the voices of ordinary Americans”.

4.20. Under the Internal Revenue Code, qualified presidential candidates may opt to receive money from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund which is a fund on the books of the USA Treasury. The Federal Election Commission administers the public funding programme by determining which candidates are eligible to receive funds.

4.21. Committees receiving public funds must agree to comply with spending limits and to keep detailed records of their financial activities. Eligible candidates in the presidential primaries may receive public funds to match the private contributions they raise. Only contributions from individuals are matchable, contributions from PACs and party committees are not. Candidates must agree to use public funds only for campaign expenses and they must comply with spending limits. 4.22. Major party nominees are eligible for a general election grant. In 2008, the last year a major party candidate chose to accept a general election grant, the amount had grown to $ 84.1 million. In 2020, the grant would have been $ 103.7 million. Nominees who accept the grant must agree not to raise private contributions from individuals, PACs, or party committees, apart from certain exceptions, and to limit their campaign expenditure to the amount of public funds they receive. They may use the funds only for campaign expenses.

4.23. The 1040 federal income tax form asks taxpayers whether they wish to designate $ 3.00 of their taxes paid to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. When taxpayers check “yes”, three of their tax dollars are placed in the Fund. This does not increase the taxes to be paid, nor decreases any refund to which they are entitled. This tax checkoff is the sole source of funds for the public funding programme.

CONCLUSION

4.24. Democracy is priceless but has operating costs. Political parties and actors need money to finance their political activities. The proposed Electoral/Democracy Fund is the mechanism through which Barbados can finance the operating costs of maintaining its democracy. The fragile nature of the finances of political parties in Barbados and the secrecy surrounding private contributions to them make our democratic processes and institutions vulnerable to undue influences from interests, local or foreign, with large sums of money, whether obtained legally or illegally. The Electoral/Democracy Fund, with appropriate rules and regulations to ensure transparency and public accountability, would eliminate this possibility; safeguard the integrity of the democratic processes and institutions; and ensure that public policy is always in the interest of the public good and not for special monied interest.

5. REFORM OF THE SENATE

5.1. A review of the Senate in some Commonwealth countries, viz: Australia, Bahamas, Belize, and Canada, reveals several points of interest as set out below.

AUSTRALIA

5.2. The Senate cannot introduce or amend appropriation bills (bills that authorize government expenditure of public revenue) or bills that impose taxation, that role being reserved for the lower house; it can only approve, reject or defer them. That degree of equality between the Senate and House of Representatives reflects the desire of the Constitution's authors to address smaller states' desire for strong powers for the Senate as a way of ensuring that the interests of more populous states as represented in the House of Representatives did not totally dominate the government.

5.3. The Senate could amend a bill, pass, or reject it. In most cases, voting takes place along party lines, although there are occasional conscience votes.

5.4. The Senate maintains several committees.

BAHAMAS

5.6. “Section 38. There shall be a Parliament of The Bahamas which shall consist of Her Majesty, a Senate, and a House of Assembly.

The Senate

39. (1) The Senate shall consist of sixteen members (in this Constitution referred to as "Senators") who shall be appointed by the Governor-General by instrument under the Public Seal in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(2) Nine Senators shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.

(3) Four Senators shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Leader of the Opposition.

(4) Three Senators shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition”.

5.7. A bill other than a Money Bill may be introduced in either House, but a Money Bill shall not be introduced in the Senate.

5.9. “59. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of the rules of procedure of the Senate or the House of Assembly, as the case may be, any member of either House may introduce any Bill or propose any motion for debate in, or may present any petition to, that House, and the same shall be debated and dispose of according to the rules of procedure of that House”.

5.10. “60. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, if a Money Bill, having been passed by the House of Assembly and sent to the Senate at least one month before the end of the session, is not passed by the Senate without amendment within one month after it is sent to that House, the Bill shall, unless the House of Assembly otherwise resolves, be present to the Governor-General for his assent notwithstanding that the Senate has not consented to the Bill. (2) There shall be endorsed on every Money Bill when it is sent to the Senate the certificate of the Speaker signed by him that it is a Money Bill; and there shall be endorsed on any Money Bill that is presented to the Governor-General for assent in pursuance of paragraph (1) of this Article the certificate of the Speaker signed by him that it is a Money Bill and that the provisions of that paragraph have been complied with”.

5.11.”61. (1) If any Bill other than a Money Bill is passed by the House of Assembly in two successive sessions (whether or not Parliament is dissolved between those sessions) and, having been sent to the Senate in each of those sessions at least one month before the end of the session, is rejected by the Senate in each of those sessions, that Bill shall, on its rejection for the second time by the Senate, unless the House of Assembly otherwise resolves, be presented to the Governor-General for assent notwithstanding that the Senate has not consented to the Bill: Provided that the foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall not have effect unless at least nine months have elapsed between the date on which the Bill is passed by the House of Assembly in the first session and the date on which it is passed by the Restriction on powers of Senate as to Money Bills. Restriction on powers of Senate as to Bills other than Money Bills. House of Assembly in the second session”.

5.12.”(2) For the purposes of this Article a Bill that is sent to the Senate from the House of Assembly in any session shall be deemed to be the same Bill as a former Bill sent to the Senate in the preceding session if, when it is sent to the Senate, it is identical with the former Bill or contains only such alterations as are certified by the Speaker to be necessary owing to the time that has elapse since the date of the former Bill or to represent any amendments which have been made by the Senate in the former Bill in the preceding session”.

5.13.”(3) The House of Assembly may, if it thinks fit, on the passage through the House of a Bill that is deemed to be the same Bill as a former Bill sent to the Senate in the preceding session, suggest any amendments without inserting the

amendments in the Bill, and any such amendments shall be considered by the Senate, and, if agreed to by the Senate, shall be treated as amendments made by the Senate and agreed to by the House of Assembly; but the exercise of this power by the House of Assembly shall not affect the operation of this Article in the event of the rejection of the Bill in the Senate”.

BELIZE

5.14. Of the twelve Senators

a. Six shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister; and

b. Three shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Leader of the Opposition; and

c. One shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Belize Council of Churches and Evangelical Association of Churches; and

d. One shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Belize Business Bureau; and

e. One shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the National Trade Union Congress and the Civil Society Steering Committee.

5.15. The powers and functions of the Senate are as follows: -

a. Authorizing the ratification (including adhesion or accession) of any treaty by the Government of Belize, including any treaty for the settlement of the

territorial dispute between Belize and the Republic of Guatemala.

b. Approving the establishment in Belize of any military base of operations for any foreign military forces.

c. Approving the appointment of the Contractor General, and the Ombudsman, a member of the Elections and Boundaries Commission, and a member of the Integrity Commission.

d. Instituting and conducting enquiries and investigations on any matter of public interest or importance, including inquiries into mismanagement or corruption by persons in the central government or public statutory bodies.

e. Receiving, reviewing and reporting on annual reports and other reports of the Auditor General, the Contractor General and the Ombudsman and instituting and conducting inquiries, investigations and hearings in relation thereto.

f. Requiring the attendance before it of the Auditor General, the Contractor General or the Ombudsman generally, in relation to the discharge of their duties and the execution of their functions.

g. Requiring the attendance before it of any Chief Executive Officer in a Government Ministry in respect of any matter of which he has knowledge by virtue of his office, or in respect of anything related to his office and the due execution of his duties; and

h. Requiring attendance before any Committee of the Senate, of any Minister of Government.

CANADA

5.16. Special committees are appointed by the Senate on an ad hoc basis to consider a particular issue. The number of members for a special committee varies, but the partisan composition would roughly reflect the strength of the parties in the whole Senate. Other committees include joint committees, comprising members of the House of Commons and the Senate. Some standing Committees are:

• Human Rights

• Banking Trade and Commerce

• Foreign Affairs and International Trade

• Legal and Constitutional Affairs

• National Security and Defense

• Transport and Communication

CONCLUSION

5.17. Senators are expected to have specialized knowledge and experience in a variety of fields. Every effort is made to have a Senate that is as balanced as possible without allowing it to frustrate the work of Government. The handling of Money Bills is outlined and prescribed. The Belize’s Constitution gives representation in the Senate to named entities: