Submission 97
To the Chairman and Members Constitutional Reform Commission ConstitutionalReform@barbados.gov.bb
Ladies and Gentlemen
Constitutional issues
18th July 2022
I am writing as a private citizen with an interest in the democratic process. I am not a politician or political scientist, and these comments are not based on any philosophy or political standpoint. They come from a mixture of observation of how things work or don’t work in various places, and some practical experience as a public servant in UK local government and working for not-for-profit organizations that interfaced with both local and central government. The aim is to make some practical suggestions that might help democracy work better.
The issues in Barbados seem to be:
The problem of a 30 nil Parliament with no Opposition
The lack of back benchers
The lack of a role for back benchers
The absence of a scrutiny function
The absence of a review process for legislation
The rubber stamp role of an unelected Senate
The electoral process
The two main forms of electoral process are first past the post and some form of proportional representation. In their pure forms both have advantages, but big disadvantages as well.
“First past the post” tends to give an outright victory and a rapid transition to a new administration. The downside is it can leave the minority - possibly a very large minority - of the electorate totally unrepresented in Parliament. This is the current position in Barbados and effectively means that there is no real Opposition. Without being represented in Parliament it cannot question Government actions in the proper forum and it has little chance of suggesting alternative policies from outside Parliament. From 2018 the DLP had little chance of a rapid recovery, even if it had been better organised.
I have seen similar situations in local authorities in the UK. Manchester City Council (pop 500,000+) has been virtually a one-party state for decades. At times there have been no opposition councillors at all. Whole sections of the population are unrepresented just because the mix of political views is generally geographically homogeneous and Labour has a majority in all wards. This can lead to overwhelming hubris by the party in power. They are not questioned so they assume they are always right. Another danger of this is that the ruling party develops its own opposition from within. This can lead to a very unstable situation (as in Manchester in the early 1980s) and is very difficult for the public servants who may not know from day to day what the official party policy is on any issue. Elsewhere in North West England, long term dominance by one party with no or negligible opposition has led to different forms of corruption.
Proportional representation is the alternative to first past the post. The danger here is that, rather than a system dominated by two major parties, there will be a plethora of small parties forming constantly changing coalitions. Italy is often quoted as the extreme example. Worse still, it can cause a drawn out inter regnum while the parties jostle and negotiate to find coalition partners. Belgium once went 589 days without a new Government forming after an election. There have also been surprisingly long delays in the Netherlands, and even in Germany. Even after the deal is done, these coalitions can be short-lived as they lack commonality of interest, and the components may simply hate each other.
A hybrid approach is worth considering. The advantage would be achieving a system which would normally secure a clear majority, but which would also ensure that significant minority interests are represented. The system in Scotland achieves this. There are constituency MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament) elected on a first past the post basis, and, in addition, MSPs elected from party lists on a proportional basis. In Scotland the mechanism for the list is, however, quite complicated.
We could have a similar but simpler system in Barbados. We could retain our 30 constituency members and add to them a further 20 MPs with seats allocated to parties in proportion to their share of the national vote.
With 20 party list members the arithmetic is easy. Each party will get an extra MP for every 5% share they achieve of the national vote. When it reaches the stage where one or more seats are left and no party has 5% unallocated, each remaining seat will go to the party with the largest percentage left.
This mechanism should give a clear result but also ensure that there is an Opposition. It also means that smaller parties can get into Parliament if 5% of the national electorate votes for them.
By this system, the 2022 General Election in Barbados would have resulted in 44 Barbados Labour Party, 5 Democratic Labour Party, and 1 Alliance Party for Progress Members of Parliament. It would be for each Party to submit its list of candidates in order of precedence to determine which candidates joined their constituency representatives (if any) in Parliament.
The future of the Senate
People may ask: “How do we pay for twenty extra MPs?” The answer could be to disband the Senate. Arguably, the Senate does not have a very clear function in practice. With an in-built Government majority, it merely rubber stamps legislation. It does not have an effective revising role. Nor does it consistently perform a scrutiny role. There are non-party interests represented in the Senate but there should be other ways of bringing in diverse views and expertise. The Social Partnership model could be developed. Also, in this day-and-age, we should be using electronic means to gather ideas and analyse public opinion.
Back Bench MPs
With so many MPs, what do they do? The answer is that those who are not in the Cabinet or on the Opposition front bench can function as back benchers. One important role of back benchers is to be front benchers in waiting, honing their skills and keeping existing front benchers on their toes.
The other role of back benchers, from the Government and Opposition sides, is to provide a proper scrutiny function by peopling a revamped committee system. There could be two types of committee:
Bill review committees - examining proposed legislation line-by-line at Committee Stage
Scrutiny committees - shadowing Ministries or groups of Ministries to test performance of functions and/or policies
Ministers should not sit on committees. They should be peopled by back benchers in broad proportion to the composition of the House. Ministers should appear as witnesses before committees.
Also, it is bad practice for a former Minister to chair a committee looking at their former function - it makes it very tempting to re-write history (they have made this mistake in the UK where the Health and Social Care Select Committee is being chaired by the longest serving Health Secretary ever - and the person, therefore, who was responsible for the pre-pandemic planning that was faulty).
How big should the Cabinet be?
There should be a constitutional limit on the size of the Cabinet. This is essential to getting the system functioning properly with Government back benchers available to do their work on committees. Would 15 be a reasonable figure for a 50-Member Parliament?
Transition of power
In Barbados we have consistently benefitted from a smooth transition of power. A losing Prime Minister will normally concede defeat in the early hours after election night. The winning Party Leader will immediately ask the President’s permission to form a Government, take over and begin assembling a Cabinet. In the UK the outgoing Prime Minister’s furniture van is driving away from the back door of No 10 Downing Street while the new Prime Minister is approaching the front door after his/her audience with the Queen. This approach should continue. The alternative of a long-drawn- out handover of power is fraught with dangers. This has been adequately illustrated by the USA at end of the Trump Presidency. If there is any delay in the handover of power, there is opportunity for mischief at worst and the country is rudderless at best.
Fixed term Parliaments
We can learn from the mistakes of the UK here. In 2010, Cameron’s Tories failed to win a majority and looked to support from the Liberal Democrats. A formal coalition was agreed and part of the price for this was the Fixed Term Parliaments Act. In the political confusion following the Brexit referendum, this left the UK with a Prime Minister (May) who could not rule effectively but could not call a General Election either. Even in more normal circumstances, Governments can just run out of steam. A “lame duck” Government that doesn’t know where it is going means that the country does not know where it is going either. When a Government has finished what it set out to do, or when circumstances change to make that programme no longer relevant, it is right that the Prime Minister should be able to seek a new mandate – or be denied one.
Bridgetown
Bridgetown presents special issues. Getting a strategic approach to development and achieving effective management of services in Bridgetown are two of the major issues facing us. In Europe, and more recently in the UK, there has been a shift to the model of elected mayors with wide ranging powers. In many cases this has been successful in regenerating rundown urban areas. The problem of this concept in Barbados is basically one of scale. Introducing it would mean there were two conflicting power bases – the city and central government. A more effective approach than the present situation is desperately needed. One option would be a Minister-led Taskforce which would include the public servants managing key service providers, and representatives from business and the resident community. The function of the Taskforce would be to get things done. Scrutiny should be provided by a standing select committee of Parliament.
The above thoughts are not original, but I hope they are of some interest and help you in your work.
Yours sincerely
